Financial Inclusion in Tunisia

Introduction

The regional imbalance between the Tunisian North-West, South-West, Centre and coast, which haslong been designed by the established regimes since the independence, has not been without

consequences for the rise of unemployment in the most disadvantaged areas.Several public, social and international actors are mobilized in these areas so as to improve the job
prospects in the labor market. In this regard, one of the proposed solutions is to encourage self employment by helping the creation of micro-enterprises through micro-credits. This financial

mechanism could promote the regional development. It has also become a component of the

development programs and a matter of priority for the transitional government.

Micro-credit is a tool that is not new in Tunisia. The old regime, through its Tunisian Solidarity Bank and

Inter-Arab ENDA microfinance institution (MFI), was the specialist in granting microcredits. 

The number of people attracted by these organizations continues to grow. A study conducted in 2010 and funded by the European Union estimated the number of the potential

applicants for micro-credits in Tunisia at one million. Nowadays, and over the past few months, some

international micro-credit institutions (Babylon, Cerise, Finance Planet) have been mobilized to cooperate

with the existing institutions. Other organizations, such as the ADEI (the Agency for the development

of the economic initiative) are already on the ground to create a future office on the Tunisian territory.

Micro -credit is an issue of competition between the social but for-profit private sector and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which are worried about this economic reinterpretation of the aid

to the poorest.

In the wake of the revolution, the challenges were enormous in Tunisia. The political impact embodied

by the departure of President Ben Ali, on January 14, has given way to a violent economic shock: tourists

have deserted, the activity was stopped because of strikes, investors fled ... And the number of the

unemployed continues to grow. According to the Central Bank of Tunisia, the detection of a slowdown in

economic growth in the country during the first quarter of 2015 to 7.1 % versus 4.2% during the same

period of 2014, describing the decline as a “marked slowdown “ .

Microcredit has quickly emerged as the solution to restart the economic machine. A history of

microfinance in Tunisia appears interesting in order to proceed, later, to the regulatory framework

governing the matter and present the actors of microlending in Tunisia.

The microcredit history in Tunisia
Some experiments were carried out before the implementation of a regulatory framework for
Microfinance. We can mention, namely the Savings Banks and the Credit Unions in the 1960s, which
were established to improve the funding of the agricultural cooperatives in particular, or the Mutual
Guarantee Associations (MGA) in the 1970s, which made their members guaranteed in the credit
institutions. However, these experiments were not satisfactory from the point of view of coverage and
sustainability. In the 1990s, some local development associations, such as ASAD, set up a microcredit
component. In 1995, Inter-Arab ENDA introduced microcredit operations in its activities and gradually
specialized in them. Although not regulatory, these activities are tolerated because of their pilot and
social nature. The Tunisian authorities recognized this sector in 1999, put in place a regulatory
framework, and established a public bank called the Tunisian Bank of Solidarity (TBS). Since then, the
microcredit sector consists of two devices that operate concurrently:
 the BTS-centered system, which was inserted into a national policy for the support of income
generation and provided highly subsidized credit, directly and indirectly through more than 280
local associations largely dependent on the State and the ruling party, both financially and in
terms of their governance;
 ENDA, which operates upon a special permission under the market conditions and according to
the international standards. In January 2011, the Tunisian revolution put an end to 20 years of
dictatorship. The interim Government, as well as the operators and donors, question the logic of
development of microcredit which had so far prevailed (national coverage and control Logic that
led to the establishment of small associations with extremely limited coverage, completely
dependent on the state subsidies and providing a very limited range of services - with the
exception of ENDA). Collaboration led to the establishment of a new regulatory framework
approved in October 2011, as well as the development of a national strategy, the "Concerted
Vision for the Development of Microfinance."

The microcredit actors in Tunisia
Professional Associations
By the new regulatory framework, the MCAs / MFIs are now compelled to create a professional
association and join it. However, it does not exist today. Some MCAs funded by BTS are gathered within a
federation ("TFMD") which is not strictly a professional association but a holding institution that shares
certain services (fund researching, accounting, human resources management, etc.).

An Information Center
The information center, which is housed by the Central Bank, identifies all the professional and private
loans next to the banking system. This center does not include the microcredit sector, apart from the
direct funding of the TBS. Today, ENDA and the TBS do not exchange information about their customers.
The TSB has a kind of centralization of the MCAs that it funds as it follows the debt repayment on the
customers’ side, therefore it can, at the same time, identify an individual client at several MCs and
inform the concerned MCAs. The 2011 Concerted Vision recognizes the importance of the quick
establishment of an information exchange system, especially in the context of the sector openness. The
probable arrival of several Greenfield MFIs in 2013, the predictable development of activities of ENDA
and TSB, and finally the reconciliation of the microcredit with the banking sector (by increasing the
maximum loan amount), make the creation of such an information center very important.
The new decree-law considers the establishment of such a system in the performance of the supervisory
authority, besides, the Concerted Vision recommends that its reconciliation with the Central Bank
Information Center.

The National Guarantee Fund- NGF
The NGF was established in 1981 to promote access to funding. It can guarantee business loans and
investments made under governmental initiatives (i.e. loans granted through the intervention of some
monetary funds, such as the NFPCST -National Fund for the Promotion of Crafts and Small Trades), the
FOPRODI - Fund of Promotion and Industrial Decentralization, and the RIETI - Incentive System for
Innovation in the Information Technology). It covers the interests generated by the debt payment failure/rescheduling
, between 50 to 90% are unpaid, and the legal proceeding charges for the loans given
through the government initiatives (ENDA cannot call upon). In 2003, ENDA’s role was confined to
agriculture, handicrafts and small trades, the TSB for its direct funding, and the MCA for their
subscription. However, the compensation implementation is almost impossible, especially because it
begins only when a gap recording (a report prepared by the official authorities stating that the customer
has not fulfilled his obligations) is established - which is rarely the case in microfinance. The MCA have
never taken benefit. The impact of the GNF in microfinance is nil.

Banks
The Tunisian Solidarity Bank (TSB) was founded in 1997, the TSB is a deposit bank governed by the
Banking Act. The government is its majority shareholder. It is among the many participants in the
national policy to support business start-ups. Its resources come mainly from the solidarity funds of the
government. The social nature of its activity is manifested through its subsidized rates, the lack of
collateral requirements, and a focus on the funding of entrepreneurship. Indirect funding: the funding of
the MCAs mentioned above, for the loans up to 5 000 TND. -term loans up to
100 000 TND (recently increased). With the new regulatory framework, which raises the ceiling of
microcredit from 5 000 to 20 000 TND, approximately 90% of these direct loans can be considered to
belong to microcredit. In December 2011, the TSB direct portfolio was of about 70 000 active customers.
In 2010, the TSB also launched a savings product, in collaboration with the Post Office, to encourage
project developers to save and accumulate the required amount of "self-funding" to have access the BTS
loans. The scope of this product is, nevertheless, very limited.

Other banks
If banks are not directly involved in micro-finance, many of them are, however, involved as financial
partners of ENDA, while others are interested in the creation of micro-credit companies under the new
decree Law. The Bank for the Funding of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (BFSME)
(http://www.bfpme.com.tn) is specialized in the funding of the SMEs.

The Tunisian post office
The National Post Office plays a crucial role in the dissemination of the savings products thanks, first, to
its extensive network (1,103 offices in 2011, 53% of which are in the 14 governorates considered
by the Ministry of Regional Development as priority zones), and second, to the interesting tariff
conditions. Even if the post is not typically considered a microfinance operator, since it is currently
specialized in savings, its products and customers, being different from those in banks, make it a major
player in the Tunisian microfinance. The 2011 Concerted Vision recommends a study about its present
and possible future role regarding financial inclusion. In 2010, the post office had 4.5 million customers
to whom it provides the following financial services: current accounts, savings accounts, bill payments,
money transfers and money orders, (pre-and post-paid) credit cards, insurance and an investment
product.
The post office is also the distribution channel of the State social transfers (retirement pensions,
scholarships, etc.).

Donors and investors
To avoid overlaps and ensure a maximum effectiveness of aid programs, the donors work together
efficiently in Tunisia. Their initiatives include several levels:
 Refinancing ENDA (bilateral agencies, financial institutions, investment funds, etc. the list of
ENDA’s financial partners is on its website)
 Refinancing the TSB (National State Funds, Islamic Development Bank http :/ / www.isdb.org,
FADES http://www.arabfund.org)
 The establishment of market infrastructure (in progress)
 A support for the Tunisian government in the development and implementation of the new
regulatory framework (namely the European Union
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tunisia/index_fr.htm), and the French Development Agency
http: / / www.afd.fr/home/pays-d-intervention-afd/mediterranee-etmoyenorient/ pays
Mediterranean /Tunisia).

Their intervention is either direct or indirect, for example, with an overall budgetary support based on
the satisfaction of the conditions related to the development of microfinance. In March 2012, a
coordinating group of donors was formed and included the following donors: AFD, the British Embassy,
the U.S. Embassy, the African Development Bank (ADB), the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), the World
Bank, the European Investment Bank (EIB), CGAP, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (FADES), German
Cooperation (GIZ), International Finance Cooperation (IFC), KfW, Proparco, the United Nations Program
for Development (UNDP), and the European Union. At the beginning of 2012, microcredit affected more
than 400,000 active customers (205,000 for ENDA and about 210,000 for the MCAs, duplicates are
possible). As the micro-credit scoped is now getting larger, most of the activities of direct funding by the
BTS could be incorporated, that is about 70,000 active customers.

The IMF
The description below shows the microcredit sector in December 2011, which consisted of more than
280 "microcredit associations" (MCA) refunded by the BTS, and ENDA. With the regulatory amendment
of October 2011, many changes are expected. On the one hand, the existing players will have to renew
their accreditation, which implies, for most of them, a restructuring or mergers. Moreover, as the
maximum amount of microcredit has been revised upwards, many of the direct financing activities of
the BTS could now fall within the scope of microcredit - the BTS is also considering reorganizing itself so
as to get a microcredit approval. On the other hand, new players are expected. Since the Decree-Law
paved the way for new types of actors (companies), it is likely that, in the medium term, sever all
companies will be providing microcredit services in Tunisia. This sector, as described below, is today
required to change in the coming months.

The Microcredit Associations (MCAs)
These MCAs’ activity is the management of microcredit; however, many of them, especially the few
NGOs created by the BTS, are also engaged in other activities, such as vocational training. From 6
MCAs, in 1999, the country has now more than 280, with an average number of 800 active borrowers.
The BTS ensures the refinancing of these institutions (at rate zero) and the coverage of some
operational costs through the allocation of start-up subsidies and through lending. The condition set by
BTS is that 80% of the overdue amount must be repaid. In December 2010, about 210,000 customers
were active for an outstanding of $ 140 million TND. In 2011, the activity deteriorated sharply in the
wake of the Tunisian revolution, which explains the economic difficulties the customers faced, the
operational difficulties related to the structural weakness of all these small organizations, and the
governance problems related, among other things, to their proximity to the former regime. This system
has certainly led to a nationwide coverage; nevertheless, it also had an effect of limiting the
development of a sustainable microfinance (see p. 32/33 for the Concerted Vision). The Concerted
Vision of 2011 recommends the restructuration of this system.

The informal sector
There are no data regarding this type of lending, however, the Concerted Vision of 2011 emphasizes the
importance of the supplier credit, the money lenders and the help of friends and family. The 2010
European Union study showed that, on a sample of 333 people, 24% had a supplier credit, 8% were
indebted to relatives, neighbors or friends, while only 8% were customers of the MCAs and 5% of ENDA.
In this sample, the proportion of the informal credit was therefore superior in number to that of the
formal one.

Inter-Arabe ENDA
ENDA Third World local representation, an NGO based in Senegal .In Tunisia, ENDA was launched in
1990 to carry out activities of urban development and environmental protection. In 1995, it included
micro lending in its activities in which it became specialized in 2000. In 2005, it obtained the permission
from the Ministry of Finance for the purpose of provide microcredit and also a special permission so as
to charge an interest rate sufficient for covering its costs, which is therefore higher than the limit set by
law. On March 31, 2012, its portfolio had 204,805 active customers for an outstanding of $ 113 million
TND. Its services are available thanks to a network of 65 agencies operating in 206 delegations.

Target clients
Target Population
• Low-income households: income-generating activities for those who have a limited and
irregular income, vulnerable and having a limited level of education and experience
• Micro-entrepreneurs who have a stable activity in an appropriate place which may grow and
create jobs
• Employees with low income (housing improvement / children’s schooling / training)
example:
Small-scale farmers
Products: (example: Inter-Arabe ENDA)
flexible, diversified, local, meet the needs of micro-entrepreneurs with a credit line between 200 DT and
5000 DT.
 Mawilni: A loan meeting the needs of micro-enterprises; max 5000 DT
 Solfa: A loan for the income-generating activities; max 1000 DT
 Mawsem: A loan for financing agricultural activities; max 5000 DT
 Eddar: for the housing improvement, max 5000 DT
 ta'alim: to finance the schooling expenses / training max 1000 DT
 Contingency funds, in case of death or disability, left from the family-based care as
compensation to the Family.

Cumulative achievement, January 1995-March 2011:
 Number of served customers: 266,000
 Number of loans: 802,000
 Amount of granted loans: DT 480 million

Impact & satisfaction:
• Improving the profits of the MSE
• Increasing the assets
• Between 1 and 2 additional jobs for a ¼ of the customers
• Improving the housing (safety, hygiene)Keeping children in school
• "Empowerment" of women

Challenges
Consumer Behavior
Due to a restrictive regulatory framework, the Tunisian MFIs focus exclusively on microcredit. However,
Tunisians are relatively better off than in other countries in terms of savings thanks to the Post Office.
With 4.5 million customers (out of a total population of 10.7 million), relatively cheap savings, payment
transfers and a network of 1,103 offices (2011), the Post Office is a key player of financial inclusion.
However, the service quality and diversity vary depending on the agency and are low in the rural areas.
ENDA’s experience and polls show that less than half of its customers have a post office account and
80% of them prefer to save in cash rather than at the post office. Payment methods and mobile banking:
Mobile banking is very limited due to the regulatory framework. A first opening was made in January
2011 to link mobile phones to a credit card, but then always leaving the monopoly of payment
transactions and deposits to the banks. A second opening phase was planned but delayed because of
the January 2011 revolution. Insurance: The new regulatory framework of 2011 stipulates that the MFIs
can operate as agents for the insurance companies. However, no service to micro entrepreneurs and to
poor households has been developed so far. Poor households benefit essentially from health insurance
provided by the public social coverage.

Regulatory framework
The Tunisian micro-credit sector is not governed by the banking regulations but by a dedicated law
under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. From 1999-2010: A first law, the Organic Law No.
99-67 of 15 July 1999, had governed the sector from 1999 to 2011. This law, as well as its ministerial
decrees, defined microcredit, created the Microcredit Association status ("MCA"), set the maximum
amount of credit (in 2010 it was 5 000 TND to finance entrepreneurship, and 1 000 TND to improve the
quality of life), and the interest rate. The law caps the interest rate at 5% per year (on the capital
remaining due), to which a maximum flat fee of 2.5% of the loan amount can be added. This regulatory
framework has greatly restricted the development of microfinance by imposing a very low rate, limiting
the range of the credit financial services and permitting only non-profit associations.
In September, 2010, a major reform was adopted with a modification of the decree of August 27,
1999.The credit conditions (i.e. 5% 2.5% "flat") concern, from now on, only the micro-loans granted on
mobilized state resources within the agreements with the BTS. The microcredit interest rates granted on
other resources can "take into account actual expenditure" besides, it is no longer capped. On the other
hand, the international NGOs, which are recognized in Tunisia, can now seek the approval of the
Ministry of Finance to conduct microcredit operations. This reform is a generalization of the special
permission given to ENDA in 2005.

Remedies
The 2011 reforms: A new regulatory framework was approved in October 2011 through the Decree Law
2011-117, this decree has:
 allowed two types of legal forms, i.e. limited companies and associations,
 defined, for the first time, governance standards, internal control, consumer protection,
reporting, etc.,
 Created a dedicated control authority under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance,
 Extended the scope of microcredit to 20 000 TND, and
 Permitted the microfinance institutions to operate as agents for the insurance companies.
This regulatory reform is a step towards practices considered good on the international level although it
still limits the scope of microfinance to microcredit only. In 2012, it was the time to pass the
implementing decrees and establish the supervisory authority to ensure that the reform will not be only
words. The future reforms: the sector supervision remains the responsibility of the
Ministry of Finance, however, the "Concerted Vision" emphasizes the need to strengthen the sector and
reconsider supervision by the Central Bank as soon as 2014 as well as openness to the other financial
services. This three-year strategy distinguishes four priorities:

 Priority 1: Establishing a regulatory framework and a supervision that contributes to the sector
development.
 A first reform, in 2011, (see new regulatory framework, October 2011), to
encourage extending microcredit to the populations still not served (low-income
employees, micro enterprises and EPT), enable the diversification of actors and
institutional development of the current players, establish an independent oversight
and finally modernize the sector through high quality standards of services,
management and governance.
 A second reform consists in moving from microcredit to microfinance, with the
reunification of the banking and microfinance supervision, and with the opening
towards other products (savings, payment means, insurance, etc..) and other
distribution channels.

 Priority 2: Contributing, via microfinance, to the development priority regions and segments:
market studying, establishing an incentive framework to encourage MFIs to reach difficult areas
and customer segments, and the coordination between the stakeholders.

 Priority 3: Structuring the industry to register its impact over time: restructuring the MCIs and
redefining the role of the TSB and the NGF, studying the role of the post office in the financial
inclusion, encouraging the private financial sector to refinance.

 Priority 4: Promoting and maintaining a responsible industry growth: establishing an
information central facility, a financial inclusion observatory, and ensuring the protection of the
customers.

This inclusive vision of microfinance in Tunisia is summarized as follows:
A / Formalizing a clear strategy:
Microfinance strategy has to identify the different strategic lines and the priorities for action in the
medium term
B / implementing an appropriate regulatory and incentive framework:
This framework should allow a healthy development of microfinance supply
C / strengthening the market infrastructure:
The market infrastructure means essentially the support functions that foster the development of
microfinance (HR, SI, accounting ......), and the signs of the sector evolution.
D / suggesting a shift of the existing players towards a viable model:
Suggesting an improvement of the AMC model
Redefining the role of the TSB
Ensuring the sustainability of the ENDA model
However, this vision is faced with many limiting factors:
A / Formalizing a clear strategy:
Before January 14, at the government level, there was no clear policy of development of microfinance as
a financial sector segment capable of finding a solution to the problem of financial exclusion.
Denying the financial exclusion of a segment of the population
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B / establishing an appropriate and incentive regulatory system:
Restricting the access to private and foreign funding
Poorly adjusted government funding
The lack of centralized data on the risks faced by MFIs and their customers' indebtedness
There is no structure regarding the supervision of the sector
-Limited regulation in terms of actors and products
-Regulation involving a structurally loss-making economic model
C / strengthening the market infrastructure:
-scarcity of specialized HR in microfinance
-lack of a representative job structure
-not clearly identified needs: no statistics or indicators of demand / supply
-insufficient and little diversified funding resources
-unsuitable services: guarantee funds for the MFIs, refinancing funds
- Insufficient supporting functions
D / suggesting a change of the existing players towards a viable model:
-very little governance transparency of most of the MCAs
-an operating model of the structurally loss-making MCAs related to regulated intermediation margins
Fragmentation of the sector consisting of small-sized MCAs
The analysis of these limitations can lead to a series of actions:
A / Develop a clear strategy:
-Expand the diagnostic study about the needs of the people and formal and informal companies which
have no access to formal finance
- Formalize the sector vision document and strategy
- Study the need to allocate the subsidized resources, subsidies and / or guarantees to MFIs or to end
customers for certain types of credit
B / Implement an appropriate regulatory and incentive framework:
-Establishing a framework that attracts the private national and foreign investment
- Simplifying the procedures for the microfinance actors to access to national and international funding
-Establishing of a central risk bureau
C / strengthening the market infrastructure
- Developing a training program specialized in microfinance
- Increasing the potential customers’ awareness of the financial and non-financial products
- Setting up indicators and market statistics particularly about the supply and demand trends
D / suggesting a shift of the existing players towards a viable model
-Understanding the existing, diagnose and audit the sector
-Identifying the sustainable economic models to ensure the actors’ financial viability

The role of banks in microfinance:
Commercial banks can engage in microfinance in different ways, ranging from direct relations with
borrowers to a more indirect participation through the raising of capital.
Direct lending
Firstly, banks can directly lend to micro entrepreneurs. Usually, a participation of this sort is observed in
banks founded with the aim of solely serving the microfinance sector. The pioneer in this field is
the Grameen Bank founded by Muhammad Yunus in 1976, with the sole goal of helping the
impoverished through the provision of small loans to a group of borrowers. Group lending consists
of the attribution of a loan to each person in the group, but the loans are not renewed to anyone in the
group if ever one borrower defaults on the loan. Consequently, through social pressure, the group
lending method gives individual’s incentives to be financially disciplined and to repay their loans.
Another example is the Pro Credit group which provides loans to small and medium-sized
enterprises through its 19 development oriented banks in Africa, Europe and Latin-American.

A microfinance subsidiary
Secondly, banks may choose to separate their microfinance operations through the creation of a new
subsidiary. Primarily, such subdivisions can help banks mitigate the levels of risks associated with
lending to the poor. Nevertheless, it can also be seen as a necessary step for banks providing both
consumer finance and microfinance, as each sector requires a different approach to business and a
distinct training of the employees. Furthermore, from the perspective of the borrower, separating the
microfinance services from the consumer finances might generate more trust and acknowledgement
of the bank’s commitment to the goal of reducing poverty. In this respect, Sogesol is the
microfinance subsidiary of the commercial bank Soge bank, the largest commercial bank in Haiti.
The many years of experience of Soge bank, bring some important advantages to Sogesol. The
loans that originate from the microfinance subsidiary can be repaid through the branches of Sogebank.
Furthermore, the parent company also provides other types of support to Sogesol such as human
resources, legal affairs, auditing and marketing.

Partnership with a microfinance institution
Thirdly, banks can build partnerships with microfinance institutions. Banks can lend to Microfinance
institutions in the form of wholesale banking, and in turn, MFIs can employ the capital to lend to the
poor. In the partnership, the bank usually provides the loan funds, the technology and evaluates the
pricing and the levels of risk involved with the loans. On the other hand, the MFIs undertake the
origination, monitoring and collection of the loan. Indeed, there are a lot of advantages for MFIs in
engaging in partnerships with banks. With the greater amount of capital comes the increase in loan
sizes, and the more branches a bank has, the greater the outreach achieved through geographical
expansion. Furthermore, the bank’s personnel can also provide mentoring to MFIs in terms of improving
the operational efficiencies of the organization and making it aware of standardized international
practices in the world of finances if the bank has reached such a standard. One
such example is the case of ICICI Bank in India which currently has partnerships with 72 MFIs
throughout the country and aims to increase the number of its alliances to 200 by 2010.
This kind of partnership can be the most beneficial and efficient for both the bank and the MFI.

A microfinance fund: securitization
Fourthly, commercial banks can raise funds in domestic or international capital markets for the lending
operations of microfinance institutions. These funds can be raised in the form of bonds in domestic
markets such as the Mibanco bond of $6 million issued in December 2002.Mibanco (Banco de la
Microempresa S.A), a private bank established in 1992 in Peru, is seeking to diversify its funding
sources through such bonds. Lucy Conger, in her article “To Market, To Market” suggests that these
bonds are being bought by high net worth individuals or institutional investors, which suggests that
microfinance is slowly becoming an integral part of the formal financial system. One role, large
banking groups can play in microfinance was exemplified by Citigroup which placed and sold the
Mibanco bond through a “Dutch auction”. Currently large commercial banks such as Citigroup,
Deutsche Bank and Rabobank have microfinance funds that provide capital to MFIs.
Deutsche Bank is involved in microfinance through the Deutsche Bank Microfinance Development
Fund (DB MDF). The bank’s strategy is “to encourage and establish relationships between local
commercial financial institutions and MFIs by providing high risk catalytic funds as collateral for
leveraged loans from local financial institutions.”. The fund makes loans with “very low-cost
financing (1 percent to 3 percent a year) with maturities of one to five year” to the MFI which earns
market interest rates on this deposit in US dollars. The institution obtains the equivalent sum in the local
currency which can then be lent out to micro-entrepreneurs. Indeed, the loans “may not be used as
working capital or as funds for direct lending”. Consequently, the capital provided by Deutsche bank
becomes a form of collateral for the MFI, a form of securitization.

Conclusion
People thinks that microfinance is only seeking for a world where a large scale of population and
households that are struggling under poverty will have a permanent access to a diversified array of high
quality financial services, such as microcredit, savings, insurance and even transfer. However, the major
goal for microfinance that triggered this trend is the promotion of economic growth around the globe
through training, supervision and support of the micro- entrepreneurs and the small business owners.
However the great mission of microfinance does not come without obstacles one important one is the
inability to support very poor population, lacking stable income, living by means of chance earnings, and
particularly having debts which cannot be clients of microfinance. The case of Tunisia is also a challenge,
the constant deterioration of the living standards and the increasing rate of poverty can only alarms for
a future crisis that will harm the both the social and the economic fabric of the society. For me
microfinance is one of the most effective tools for these kinds of situation, and maybe the several
examples around the world can strengthen my case. However, the implementation, control and success
of this strategy will need the cooperation of all the entities of the society from politician and civic society
to the regular citizen who needs to get help through this tool. Finally how can the microfinance be more
implemented in Tunisia? how can we reinforce the presence and outreach of the MFIs existing in
Tunisia? And what are the other regulations that can contribute in the prosperity of microfinance in
Tunisia?